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1. Introduction 
  In developing countries, high interest rates and credit rationing are characteristic of rural 
credit markets. Although the governments have been trying to supply cheap credit to farmers 
through the various financial systems to resolve such problems, formal credit has not 
contributed to mitigating high interest rates and credit rationing in the informal credit market 
(Von Pischke et al, 1983). One explanation for the failure is that the market interventions 
are based on an inadequate understanding of how rural credit markets work. 
  But in the past decade there have been major advances in theoretical understanding of 
credit markets. These advances have evolved from a paradigm that emphasizes the problem 
of imperfect information and imperfect enforcement (Bell 1988, Braverman and Guash 1991, 
Hoff and Stiglitz 1990). 
  According to Hoff and Stiglitz (1990), these new views of rural credit markets are based 
on the following observations. 
  1. Borrowersdiffer in the likelihood that they will default, and it is costly to determine the 
extent of that risk for each borrower. This is conventionally known as the screening problem. 
  2. It is costly to ensure that borrowers take action which make repayment most likely. 
This is the incentives problem. 
  3. It is difficult to compel repayment. This is the enforcement problem. 
 They distinguish two types of mechanisms for solving these problems; indirect and direct. 
  Indirect mechanisms are contracts in which the borrowers are induced to takeaction 
reducing likelihood of default and repay the loan whenever they have the resources to do so, 
in their own best interests. When qualities of borrowers are unknown to lenders, lenders 
may make a contract o reveal the borrowers qualities. One of these contracts is the one with 
the screening and/or incentive mechanism. Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] proved multiple interest 
rates equilibrium may exist in such a case. Another case is the implicit contract where if the 
borrower defaults on loans, the lender cuts off credit, the defaulting tarnishes their reputation 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983). 
 In addition to indirect mechanisms, the lender may use the direct screening mechanisms
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and/or may monitor the borrowers' behavior. 
  In developing countries, we can observe the institutional arrangements which lower the 
costs for screening or monitoring. In Nigeria, credit markets are almost completely segmented 
along eographic lines and kinship groups, and information asymmetries b tween lender 
and borrower within these markets appear tobe negligible (Udry, 1990). Besides geography 
and kinship groups, linking a loan with transaction in the product market, rental markets or
labor market, may alleviate screening, incentive, and enforcement problems (Bardhan, 1980, 
Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982, Siamwalla nd others, 1990, Floro and Yotopolos, 
forthcoming). Furthermore, three devices; collateral requirements usufruct loans, rotating 
savings and credit associations are commonly used to limit the results of information 
asymmetries and enforcement problems (Siamwalla and others, Izumida, 1992). 
  In our study area, the above mentioned direct mechanisms arenot common 1.But, while 
high interest rates charged by moneylenders exist, much lower interest rates were found to 
be agreed upon through personal relation between lender and borrower. In the latter cases, 
interest rates were highly variable across individual cases (Table II). 
 Although t e screening model by Stiglitz and Weiss can explain the variability ofinterest 
rates, itdoes not explore the relation between i terest rate and personal relation. It is not 
clear how the threat of cutting off credit s related to the variability ofinterest rates. It may 
be helpful to explain the role of personal relations indetermining the interest rate. 
 The objectives of this paper are to investigate why credit contracts with low interest rates 
and personal relations are so common, and to show how personal relation is an important 
determinant of interest rate in the informal credit market. 
 We postulate that his type of credit contract exists because the lender induces the borrower 
to avoid defaulting by promising to provide cheaper c edit through areciprocal personal 
relation. 
 To elucidate this, first we will present a heoretical model to prove that the above mentioned 
reciprocal credit contract an be optimal nd sustained as a non-cooperative equilibrium in a 
repeated game (Radner, 1981, de Janvry et al, 1990). Second, based on a Philippine case 
study, we will present an empirical Tobit ype of model showing that personal relations are 
an important determinant of interest rate, assets and income in the informal credit market.
2. A Theoretical Model of Reciprocal Informal Credit Contract 
 In this section, we present a theoretical explanation for the existence of reciprocal credit 
contracts, characteristic of credit market in the study area. 
 For this purpose, we assume a one-period principal agency framework in which a lender
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maximizes his expected income according to the terms of the contract which are subject to 
the borrower's (farmer's) reservation utility and work efforts. 
 In this framework, the contract isdefined by principal Band interest rate R. We assume if
the borrower's income is not below the principal and the interest, he will repay them; 
Otherwise, he will have to pay all his income. The output depends on the land and the 
borrower's work effort (A). We assume that the production risk and the asymmetric 
information about his does not exist, so that we can ignore the screening function of interest 
rates. We also assume that factor marks do not exist and that the commodity market is 
competitive. 
  a) The case where the contract isenforceable 
 If f(A; 7) is the amount of production at harvest, he borrower's income (X) is;
 Here, f(•) is the well-behaved production function and input of land is assumed to be 
constant. I indicates non-labor income such as remittance, saving, gift etc. and is constant. 
 Taking into account he disutility of work, the borrower's problem is to choose an A that 
maximizes his utility,
Here Ch indicates family characteristics: 




 In Fig. 1, we illustrate an equilibrium point (A; R) in this case. The utilities for the lender 
and the borrower are (D, W) respectively. 
b) The case where the contract is unenforceable 
 If the borrower defaults ex post, we will execute an announced work effort, and the lender's 
income will be zero (= D'). The borrower's utility Wis larger than W. Here X = f(A; 7) + 1. 
In this case, the lender has no incentive to make a contract.
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Therefore, we assume the lender can enforce the contract
enforcement cost EC (> 0).
The borrower's utility
He can obtain the income
is lower than
by the spending
 Next, we will extend this model to a multi-period model. The sequential decision-making 
process considered here is dictated by the intertemporal production process. The lender 
announces his strategy (if the borrower abides by the contract (A), the lender will provide 
him with a cheaper interest rate (R), the borrower chooses his action (A), the lender acts upon 
his announcement. After that, this process will be repeated. If the lender announces (A, R), 
and it is executed, the utilities for the lender and the borrower will be (D, 1') respectively.
 Now, we proceed to establish the conditions insuring that the reciprocal contract will be 
the equilibrium strategy. For this, we establish conditions under which there exist values of 
G (reward if the borrower abides by the contract) for which the reciprocal contract (A) is 
acceptable until the period preceding any predeterminance from t*. 
  The trigger strategy is composed of a reference strategy and of a retaliation procedure in 
case of default by the other partner (Table III). 
 (i) Reference strategy. Each partner conforms to the contract (A; R) if the other doses. It 
switches to the noncooperative Nash equilibrium (A*; R*) at t = t* if the other agent switches 
to the Nash equilibrium at t*, based on agreement on t*. 
  (ii) Retaliation procedure. If one of the partners defaults at t° <_ t*, the other will switch to 
the noncooperative Nash strategy at t° + 1. 
 (ii. 1) If the borrower defaults, he does so by working the quantity A' at t° that maximizes 
his utility in the contract (A'; R), i.e.,
 which yields 14> W for him but b'< D for the lender. 
  (ii. 2) If the lender does not honor the contract (A, k) at to, the contract becomes, for that 
period, identical to the contract (A, R) which yields D" (= R B) and W' (< W*). 
 To establish the equilibrium strategy inthis reciprocal contract, we consider ainfinite T-
period sequence ofcontracts. Clearly, if the trigger strategy is effective and the reference 
game prevails, the optimal strategy isto set t* = T. We now need to determine under which 
conditions the trigger strategy iseffective in deterring both partners from defaulting. This is 
done by considering the successive payoffs that the borrower and the lender could derive 
from defaulting.
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b) The Equilibrium Contract for t < T 
 (i) Payoffs from the borrower defaulting. The lender will clearly lose from any the 
borrower defaulting. For the borrower, the value of the payoffs from alternative strategies 
are: 
      Reference strategy:
Borrower defaults at to:
where there is the borrower's discount factor. 
From this, we see that the net gain from defau lting at t° = t* is
The net gain from defaulting at t° < t* is
The borrower will default before t* if this net gain from defaulting is positive , i.e., if
 By differentiating (W' - W) / (W - W*) with respect to G(= R B - RB), one can show that 
it is a decreasing function f(G) of G
 where RT = U" / U' is the degree of risk aversion for the borrower. This condition is more 
likely to hold the lower the degree RT of risk aversion for the borrower. In this case,
the borrower defaults at t° = 0;
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the borrower defaults at
the minimum gift f '
the borrower will not default. This last condition establishes
((x) that the lender needs to give to prevent he borrower from defaulting
This minimum G is a decreasing function of a and an increasing function of the
utility of leisure.
(ii) Payoffs from defaulting by the lender. If it is the lender who defaults on the gift at
the borrower always loses by the amount
For the lender, the present value of the payoffs 
Reference strategy:
from alternative strategies are
Lender defaults at
where is the len der's discount factor.
The net gain from defaulting at
The net gain from defau lting at
where Default will, consequently, occur when
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There consequently, exists a t° <- t* - 1 at which the lender has advantage to default if
This establishes the maximum G that the lender can give without having an incentive to 
default at t° < t*. 
  In conclusion, the equilibrium conditions for the contract before time t* are: 




(ii) The lender will only accept the reference contract if the borrower has no incentive to 
fault, i.e., if G > f -' ((x). An efficient, cooperative-equivalent contract will only be feasible
 If and only if this condition is established, both the lender and the borrower will have no 
incentive to default at t° < t*. The trigger strategy will be effective in ensuring (A, R) as the 
equilibrium contract. 
 In addition, it can be easily shown that the more the lender attaches importance to the 
borrower's welfare, the higher G he offers.
3. The Empirical Evidence 
  In the previoussection, we showed that in a reciprocal credit contract through personal 
relations, the interest rates can be lower than those offered by money lender. The amount 
varies for each individuals. 
 Next, we presented empirical evidence to support he theoretical explanation of the facts. 
 Following equations (1), (2) and (3), an actual interest rate Rim for each household i = 1, 
  n, can be shown as a function of family asset T (planted area of paddy, Animals Owned, 
Machines Owned), non-labor income I (Debt from formal sector, Remittance, Off-farm labor 
income), family characteristics Ch (Education, Family labor ratio), the amount of Debt B
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(Debt from informal sector), opportunity income W and the personal relation between the 
lender and the borrower Re;
 In order to estimate the determinants of interest rates in the informal credit market, the 
following standard Tobit econometric model of interest rates is assumed:
 Rm is an actual interest rate, (3's are parametric and the u is independent. Normally 
distributed error processes have zero mean and constant variance. As for Z's and X's, the 
definitions are listed in Table II.
otherwise, Rm = 0.
  The results of the estimate are given in Table IV. The parameters of the personal relation 
dummy, the amount of formal credit, planted area of paddy, animal, machine and income, 
are negative. In village T, the formal credit or planted area, and machine significantly affect 
the interest rate, but not in village D. The personal relation negatively and significantly 
affects the interest rate in both villages Z. This proves the personal relation to be a common 
determinant of interest rate in the informal credit market. 
 Why do family asset such as land and fixed capital determine the interest rate? It is 
reasonable to assume that larger family assets negatively affect production risk. The less 
risky the agricultural production, the lower the interest rate is, as shown in Stiglitz and Weiss 
[1981]. 
 As for the amount of debt, the parameters are significant. Results show that the more the 
borrower gets a loan, the higher interest rate he will have to pay.
4. Conclusion 
 The results of our analysis indicate that if the borrower has the reciprocal personal 
relationship with the lender and has larger assets, he has access to cheaper credit. On the 
other hand, if the borrower does not have a personal or social connection and smaller assets,
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he is ineligible for cheaper credit. 
 Presently the governments in most developing countries are trying to introduce market 
mechanisms forfinancing agricultural credit. But such a development, strategy cannot provide 
the rural poor with a cheaper credit. However, this can stop the official fund from going 
only to the wealthy farmers who have access to public channels. 
 This paper shows that he rural credit market is segmented, sothe new rural credit system 
may not be as effective as expected. 
 Therefore, itis strongly suggested that he government apply rural development strategies 
which create job opportunities forrural poor and provide an alternative rural financing system 
which promotes the mobilization of potential savings in rural area.
Note
2
We conducted a field study to collect he micro household ata in two villages. D and T, in the 
Philippines. Village D is a traditional rice-growing village and has a strong `Moral Economy' 
based on voluntary interpersonal transfers of money or goods. Village T is located near Metro 
Manila and the significance of`Moral Economy' is weaker. For a complete description of`Moral 
Economy', refer to Scott [1976] and Ravallion and Dearden [1988]. 
One explanation of the insignificance of assets and formal credit in village D, may be that 
neighbourliness and reciprocity are more important in the traditional rural village, where there is 
still a significant presence of the `Moral Economy'.
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Utility Matrix Showing the Game Strategy
Creditor's Strategy  (1) 
A (=A*)
Debtor's Strategy 
   (2) 
A
  (3) 
A' (defect)
(1) Purly Economic High-interest 
   Contract with Enforcement Cost 
     R* (= R) 
(2) Reciprocal Low-interest Contract 



























Total School Year of Househod Head 
Ratio of Family Laborer 
Log (Owned Animal) 
Log (Owned Machine) 
Planted Area for Rice Production 
Log (Househod Income) 
Interest Rate of Current Outstanding Debt from Informal 
Sector 
Log (Current Outstanding Debt from Private Sector) 
Log (Current Outstanding Debt from Formal Sector) 
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Log of Likelihood 
Function 
No. of Observations. 









Note: * indicates significane at 1% level: 
** at 5% level; Figures in parentheses refer to I-statistic .
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